DHC-2Beaver
de Havilland CanadaEffective Sep 29, 2026Timetable 1995–2024
What mechanics have reported to the FAA on the de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver, the airworthiness directives in force, and the NTSB accident record, on one sheet. DHC-2 Mk I Beaver (R-985), including ex-military L-20/U-6A and turbine conversions.
Top six of ten systems. Counts reflect who reports, not how reliable the airplane is.
- Registered
- 254 in the U.S., FAA registry Sep 29, 2026
- Reports on file
- 450 since 1995
- 2016–2025
- 18, about 7.1 a year per 1,000 registered
- ADs in force
- 21 (10 airframe, 11 engine)
- Accidents
- 160 since 1995, 29 fatal
Airworthiness directives
21 in force · 1 superseded not shown
From Federal Register final rules since 1995. Whether an AD applies to a particular airplane depends on its serial number, engine and installed equipment; confirm against the FAA’s Dynamic Regulatory System.
AD2020-16-15Effective Sep 21, 2020Viking Air Limited AirplanesRepetitive
Cracks have been reported on forward and aft float strut wire pull fittings in certain Viking Air Limited DHC-2 airplanes. This AD requires inspection and corrective action to address the unsafe condition.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2018-19-11Effective Oct 30, 2018Viking Air Limited AirplanesRepetitive
Cracking has been found in the wing rear spar web at the wing station where the flap outboard hinge is attached. This AD requires inspection and corrective actions to address the unsafe condition.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2016-25-22Effective Dec 22, 2016Viking Air Limited AirplanesOne-time
Corrosion of the elevator control rod and elevator actuating lever on the control column could cause these components to fail. The AD requires actions to identify and correct this unsafe condition.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2015-02-10Effective Feb 18, 2015Viking Air Limited AirplanesRepetitive
Failed locknuts on the horizontal stabilizer attach bracket can create an unsafe condition. This AD requires inspection and corrective actions to address failed locknuts on affected aircraft.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2008-12-12Effective Jul 23, 2008Viking Air Limited Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-3 AirplanesOne-time
This AD supersedes a previous directive for Viking Air Limited DHC-2 and DHC-3 aircraft to address an unsafe condition identified through mandatory continuing airworthiness information. The AD requires operators to comply with corrective actions specified in the directive.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2008-11-11Effective Jul 23, 2008Viking Air Limited Model DHC-2 Series AirplanesOne-time
This AD supersedes a previous airworthiness directive for Viking Air Limited Model DHC-2 Series airplanes to address an unsafe condition identified by mandatory continuing airworthiness information. The AD requires corrective actions to ensure continued safe operation of these aircraft.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2007-12-13Effective Jul 16, 2007Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate No. A-806 Previously Held by deHavilland Inc.) Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III AirplanesOne-time
This airworthiness directive supersedes a previous directive for de Havilland DHC-2 aircraft based on mandatory continuing airworthiness information from another aviation authority. The AD requires specific actions to address an unsafe condition identified on these aircraft models.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2002-14-28Effective Sep 6, 2002de Havilland Inc. Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III AirplanesRepetitive
Front fuselage struts can develop corrosion or fatigue damage over time, potentially causing structural failure and loss of aircraft control. Operators must either replace front fuselage struts every 15 years or repetitively inspect them for corrosion or fatigue damage and replace when damage exceeds specified limits.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterShow 2 older
AD2002-13-08Effective Aug 13, 2002de Havilland Inc. Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III AirplanesRepetitive
Corrosion in mass balance weights at elevator tip ribs can cause loss of balance weight and elevator separation during flight. This AD requires modification of the elevator tip rib, repetitive inspections underneath mass balance weights for corrosion, and removal or replacement of corroded ribs as needed.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD99-15-07Effective Sep 10, 1999deHavilland Inc. Models DHC-2 Mk. I, DHC-2 Mk. II, and DHC-2 Mk. III AirplanesRepetitive
Cracks can develop in the rear fuselage bulkhead at Station 228, potentially leading to structural failure and loss of aircraft control. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the rear fuselage bulkhead for cracks, and repair or replacement of any cracked bulkhead per manufacturer procedures.
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2024-04-51Effective Mar 28, 2024Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. EnginesEmergency AD
Second-stage power turbine blade failures have been reported on these engines. Remove affected PT2 blades prior to the next flight and prohibit installation of affected PT2 blades.
Engine models named PT6A-64, PT6A-66, PT6A-66A, PT6A-66B, PT6A-66D, PT6A-67, PT6A-67A, PT6A-67AF, PT6A-67AG, PT6A-67B, PT6A-67D, PT6A-67F
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2022-08-13Effective May 27, 2022Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Turboprop EnginesRepetitive
Low-time fractures of compressor turbine blades have caused loss of engine power and in-flight shutdowns on certain P&WC turboprop engines. The AD requires replacement of certain compressor turbine vanes and removal from service of certain compressor turbine blades that operated with specific vane configurations.
Engine models named PT6A-114, PT6A-114A, PT6A-34, PT6A-34AG, PT6A-34B
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2016-05-13Effective Apr 22, 2016Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Turboprop EnginesOne-time
Certain Pratt & Whitney Canada turboprop engines have Woodward fuel control units with two-ply Cu-Be bellows that can corrode and perforate, potentially causing engine failure and in-flight shutdown. This AD requires removing affected Woodward FCUs and installing eligible replacement units.
Engine models named PT6A-60AG, PT6A-65AG, PT6A-67AF, PT6A-67AG
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2014-17-08Effective Jun 5, 2015Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Turboprop EnginesRepetitive
Compressor turbine blades in certain PT6A engines can fail, potentially damaging the engine and aircraft. The AD requires borescope inspections of compressor turbine blades and removal of any blades that fail inspection.
Engine models named PT6A-114, PT6A-114A
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2012-09-10Effective May 23, 2012Pratt & Whitney Canada Turboprop EnginesOne-time
Certain Timken Alcor Aerospace Technologies first stage sun gears and planet gears in the reduction gearbox can fail, causing in-flight engine shutdown and possible uncontained failure. Remove these affected parts from service.
Engine models named PT6A-110, PT6A-112, PT6A-114, PT6A-114A, PT6A-121, PT6A-135, PT6A-135A, PT6A-38, PT6A-41, PT6A-42, PT6A-42A, PT6A-61
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterShow 6 older
AD2011-25-12Effective Dec 28, 2011Pratt & Whitney Canada Turboprop EnginesOne-time
Certain Timken Alcor Aerospace Technologies replacement sun gears and planetary gear sets in the propeller reduction gearbox may fail, causing engine in-flight shutdown and possible uncontained engine failure. This AD requires removal of affected TAATI PMA replacement first stage reduction sun gears and/or interacting planetary gear sets.
Engine models named PT6A-15AG, PT6A-27, PT6A-28, PT6A-34, PT6A-34AG, PT6A-34B, PT6A-36
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2011-20-51Effective Nov 1, 2011Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-15AG, -27, -28, -34, -34AG, -34B, and -36 Series Turboprop EnginesEmergency AD
Certain PMA replacement first stage reduction sun gears from Timken Alcor Aerospace Technologies have failed in service. This AD requires removal of affected TAATI first stage reduction sun gears and interacting planet gears from the propeller reduction gearbox assembly.
Engine models named PT6A-15AG, PT6A-27, PT6A-28, PT6A-34, PT6A-34AG, PT6A-34B, PT6A-36
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2004-25-18Effective Jan 18, 2005Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-60A and PT6A-65B Turboprop EnginesOne-time
Woodward propeller governor assemblies on certain PT6A-60A and PT6A-65B engines can cause difficult directional control during landing. This AD requires replacing the affected governor assemblies.
Engine models named PT6A-60A, PT6A-65B
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2002-23-13Effective Dec 31, 2002Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A Series Turboprop EnginesRepetitive
Cracks have been found along weld seams in certain turbine exhaust ducts on PT6A engines that were modified by various companies. This AD requires inspections for low-quality welds and cracks to prevent separation of the reduction gearbox and propeller from the engine.
Engine models named PT6A series
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD2001-20-01Effective Nov 5, 2001Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-25C and -114A Series Turboprop EnginesRepetitive
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-25C and -114A engines may experience wear in the compressor bleed valve assembly causing power loss or in-flight shutdown. The AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and eventual replacement of the compressor bleed valve assembly with a redesigned version.
Engine models named PT6A-114A, PT6A-25C
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterAD95-13-08Effective Jul 12, 1995Pratt & Whitney Canada Model PT6A-67D Turboprop EnginesRepetitive
Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67D engines installed on Beech 1900D aircraft may experience cracking in compressor turbine components. After installation of improved engine components, owners must remove the engine RPM operating restriction placard and revert the Airplane Flight Manual to its original state.
Engine models named PT6A-67D
Read the AD in the Federal RegisterEngine ADs name an engine model family used on some Beavers; check the exact model and serial.
Accident history
160 U.S. accidents involving the Beaver since 1995, 29 of them fatal, with 94 fatalities. Homebuilt aircraft excluded. Counts, not rates: they follow fleet size, hours flown and how the airplane is used.
- Ground111
- Takeoff and climb644
- Cruise2412
- Maneuvering107
- Approach and descent50
- Landing443
- Other or unknown22
Phase of the event the NTSB recorded as defining the accident.
- 1995–1999229
- 2000–2004303
- 2005–2009286
- 2010–2014253
- 2015–2019265
- 2020–2024243
- 2025–202650
2026 is year to date. Investigations can take a year or more to reach the data.
NTSB cause findings, 2008–2026 · share of 89 accidents with findings
- 55% Personnel issues
- 28% Aircraft performance and control
- 17% Environmental issues
- 12% Aircraft systems, powerplant and structure
- 4.5% Not determined
Most frequent cause findings
- Aircraft controlPersonnel issues25
- Decision making/judgmentPersonnel issues15
- Directional control: not attained/maintainedAircraft performance and control10
- Use of equip/systemPersonnel issues4
- Forgotten action/omissionPersonnel issues2
- Monitoring environmentPersonnel issues2
- Altitude: not attained/maintainedAircraft performance and control2
- LE flap control system: incorrect use/operationAircraft systems, powerplant and structure2
- Pitch control: not attained/maintainedAircraft performance and control2
- Configuration: incorrect use/operationAircraft performance and control2
Findings about systems and powerplant
- LE flap control system: incorrect use/operationFlight control system2
- Fuel selector/shutoff valve: unintentional use/operationFuel system1
- Fuel selector/shutoff valve: incorrect use/operationFuel system1
- Gear extension and retract sys: not used/operatedLanding gear system1
- Recip eng cyl section: failureEngine (reciprocating)1
- Nose/tail landing gear: damaged/degradedLanding gear system1
- Brake: unintentional use/operationLanding gear system1
- Fuel: fluid levelFluids1
Wording is the NTSB’s. An accident can carry findings in several categories. Read individual investigations in the NTSB’s CAROL database.
What gets written up
450 reports · 1995–2024
The ten systems with the most service difficulty reports, by FAA system code (JASC). Fewer than 200 reports were filed on the Beaver in 2016–2025, so read these as long-run patterns.
85Reciprocating Engine Cylinder Section6514%4
Parts most often named Cylinder Head (22) · Cylinder (21) · Stud (5) · Piston (3)
DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, ENGINE LOST PARTIAL POWER. PILOT TURNED AROUND TO RETURNED, COULD NOT MAINTAIN ALTITUDE, AND LANDED. DURING TAXIING THE ENGINE DIED. PILOT NEVER TRIED TO RESTART ENGINE AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS TOWED. NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT. INVESTIGATION FOUND THE NR 8 CYLINDER EXHAUST VALVE PUSHROD BROKEN AT ROCKER ARM END. THE PUSHROD WAS REPLACED AND THE ENGINE IS RUNNING GOOD.
(CAN) DURING AN INSPECTION FOR METAL CONTAMINATION FOUND AT A SCHEDULED INSPECTION, THE NR 8 CYLINDER EXHAUST VALVE GUIDE WAS FOUND TO HAVE COME LOOSE AND WAS BEING STRUCK BY THE EXHAUST VALVE. THE CYLINDER PN 399353, [S/N removed] WAS REMOVED WITH 1104.0 TSO, AND REPLACED WITH A [S/N removed] CYLINDER, PN SAME, [S/N removed] WITH TSO 292.6 TREM 1207.4. ALL WORK WAS PERFORMED MM. GROUND RUN AND LEAK CARRIED OUT, NO DEFECTS.
(CAN) DURING INSPECTION FOUND FOUR FAILED STUDS ON NR 3 CYLINDER ASSEMBLY. ALSO CRACK WAS SEEN ON FRONT CRANK CASE ADJACENT TO THE CYLINDER.
32Wheel/Ski/Float296.4%2
Parts most often named Fitting (8) · Torque Tube (3) · Plate (2) · Bar (2)
FORWARD LT LOWER TIE-ROD (FLYING WIRE) WIRE-PULL ATTACHMENT FAILED. THE AFT RT UPPER TIE-ROD (FLYING WIRE) WIRE-PULL ATTACHMENT FAILED. THE AIRCRAFT'S RIGIDITY TO ITS FLOATS BECAME EFFECTED, THE AIRCRAFT PIVOTED (ROLLED) TO THE LEFT. THE AIRCRAFT'S LT WING CONTACTED THE WATER RESULTING IN IT BECOMING SUBMERGED UPSIDE DOWN IN THE WATER.
(CAN) DURING A SCHEDULED 100 HR INSPECTION, THE RT FORWARD FLOAT FITTING, PN 58S926R WAS FOUND CRACKED ON THE BOTTOM SIDE OF THE FORWARD HOLE. THE FLOAT FITTING WAS REPLACED WITH A [S/N removed] FITTING, PN 58S926R TO RECTIFY THE DEFECT.
(CAN) ON ROUTINE INSPECTION OF FLOAT ASSY FOUND SMALL CRACK ON THE LT SIDE OF THE FORWARD SPREADER BAR. UPON REMOVAL OF THE FORWARD SPREADER BAR FOUND THAT THE RT FORWARD SPREADER BAR ATTACH FITTING WAS CRACKED. THE FLOATS WERE REMOVED FROM [S/N removed] AND THE OTHER ACFT THAT HAD THE ALUMINIUM ATTACH FITTING WAS INSPECTED WITH NO DEFECTS FOUND. THERE WAS NO VISIBLE INDICATION, FRETTING SMOKING OR LOOSENESS OF ATTACH BOLT ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE SPREADER BAR.
85Reciprocating Engine Power Section214.7%0
Parts most often named Connecting Rod (3) · Main Bearing (2) · Engine (2) · Case (2)
(CAN) DURING CRUISE, THE ENGINE HAD HIGH VIBRATIONS FOR COUPLE OF SECONDS AND THEN THE ENGINE STOPS SUDDENLY. THE PILOT DID AN EMERGENCY LANDING. THE AME`S FOUND THE CYLINDER NR 5 BEEN PUNCTURED BY CONNECTING ROD. ENGINE OVERHAUL SHOP ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE FAILURE OF THE MASTER CONNECTING ROD. ENGINE OIL SAMPLE WAS SENT FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION.
DURING INSPECTION METAL PIECES FOUND IN ENGINE SUMP. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THEM TO BE PART OF FLANGE OF MASTER ROD BEARING. ENGINE REMOVED FOR OVERHAUL.
(CAN) DURING RUNUP AFTER INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION OF A MINOR OIL LEAK REVEALED THAT THE ENGINE CRANKCASE WAS CRACKED NEAR AN ENGINE THROUGHBOLT AT THE BASE OF NR 2 CYLINDER, BETWEEN CYLS NR 2 AND NR 3. THE ENGINE WAS REPLACED. (TC NR 20071109004)
27Rudder Control System173.8%1
Parts most often named Control Cable (6) · Torque Tube (3) · Mount (2) · Spring (1)
(CAN) AFTER WATER LANDING PILOT EXPERIENCED LOSS OF WATER RUDDER STEERING CONTROL. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE AIRCRAFT AND FOUND THE TORQUE TUBE WHICH CONTROLS THE WATER RUDDER/TAIL WHEEL STEERING HAD SUFFERED A TORSIONAL SHEAR ACROSS THE TUBES DIAMETER AT ITS MIDWAY POINT. THE FAILURE WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF INTERNAL CORROSION ON THE TUBE.
(CAN) ON THE TAKEOFF RUN THE PILOT HOLDING FULL RT RUDDER NOTED A LOUD SNAP AND THE RT RUDDER PEDAL MOVED FORWARD TO THE FIRE WALL. THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AND THE ACFT RETURNED TO THE DOCK. ON INVESTIGATION, IT WAS REVEALED THAT THE RT RUDDER BRACKET HAD FAILED AT THE LOWER WELDED ATTACH AREA. IT APPEARS THAT THE WELD DID NOT FULLY PENETRATE THE TUBULAR SUB STRUCTURE AND POPPED OFF THE BRACKET ASSY. THE OPERATORS FLEET WERE INSPECTED FOR SIMILIAR DAMAGE BUT NONE WERE FOUND TO BE FAULTY.
(CAN) ON REMOVAL OF RUDDER FOR BEARING REPLACEMENT CORROSION WAS PRESENT ON THE OB ATTACH POINTS OF THE RUDDER BELLCRANK NR C2TR445 (PICTURE ATTACHED) CORROSION WAS NOT EVIDENT BEFORE THE REMOVAL OF THE RUDDER AS THE DAMAGED AREA WAS COVERED BY THE RUDDER CONNECTING RODS NR C2UT233. THE AIRCRAFT NOTED ABOVE HAS BEEN OPERATED EXTENSIVELY FROM SALT WATER. (TC NR 20070209005)
74Magneto/Distributor143.1%1
Parts most often named Magneto (3) · Gear (2) · Spring (1) · Distributor Gear (1)
(CAN) DURING THE SECOND GROUND RUN ON AN O/H ENGINE, THE ENGINEER SELECTED RT MAGNETO, THE ENGINE RPM DECAYED, AND WAS FOLLOWED BY A LOUD BACKFIRE. THE ENGINEER SELECTED BOTH MAGNETOS AND THEN SHUT ENGINE DOWN. AFTER AN INSPECTION, THE RT INTERNAL DRIVE GEAR HAD FOUND TO HAVE FAILED. TIME ON THE MAG WAS 0.0 TSO. THE RT MAGNETO, PN SB9RU-3, [S/N removed] WAS REPLACED WITH AN O/H MAGNETO, PN SB9RU-3, [S/N removed] IAW MM. GROUND RUN PROCEDURES CARRIED OUT AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO [S/N removed].
LT MAGNETO SEAL - PART OF BLOWER ASSY APPEARS TO HAVE SHRUNK ALLOWING SEAL TO LEAK IN 4 BOLT HSG PLATE PN 164315. PERHAPS THE ENGINE OIL IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE SEAL MATERIALS. SB 1266 EXPLAINS THIS ASSEMBLY.
(CAN) DURING CRUISE OPERATIONS, THE ENGINE WAS NOTED AS RUNNING ROUGH. THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THE MAINTENANCE FACILITY FOR INVESTIGATION. INSPECTION REVEALED A UNSERVICABLE DISTRIBUTOR GEAR. MAGNETO REMOVED FROM [S/N removed].
53Fuselage Main, Frame122.7%0
Parts most often named Frame (9) · Strut (1) · Tube (1) · Tube Frame (1)
(CAN) DURING MODIFICATION TO THE FWD FUSELAGE FRAME "BIRDCAGE" IAW STC SA97-88, A LOT OF CORROSION HAS BEEN VISUALLY DISCOVERED ON THE LOWER TUBES. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE CHEAPER AND FASTER TO CHANGE THE BIRDCAGE RATHER THAN REPAIR IT. THIS BIRDCAGE HAS BEEN SENT AS A CORE EXCHANGE AND THEN SENT FOR FURTHER EXPERTISE.
(CAN) DURING AN UNSCHEDULED FWD TUBULAR FRAME, BIRDCAGE REPLACEMENT, THE RUDDER STOPS ON THE RECEIVED REPAIRED TUBULAR STRUCTURE WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN WELDED .5" FWD OF THE DWG LOCATION. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THE FUEL SELECTOR CABLE GUARD WAS FOUND WELDED ON THE WRONG SIDE. BOTH ITEMS WERE REPAIRED IAW THE APPLICABLE DWG C2FS, 3147A, SB 2/49, AND PSM 1-2-3 TO RECTIFY THE DEFECTS.
(CAN) INSPECTION REQUIRED BY CF98-38 WAS CARRIED OUT. THE BULKHEAD AND THE CHANNEL ASSEMBLY WERE FOUND CRACKED. P/N C2FS533 FORMER AND P/N C2FS4045A WERE REPLACED.
55Elevator, Spar/Rib Structure112.4%0
Parts most often named Spar (6) · Rib (4) · Doubler (1)
DURING ROUTINE MX WITH THE ELEVATOR OFF, A CRACK WAS NOTED ON THE BUTT RIB DOUBLER PN C2-TE-9ND. CF80-25 REQUIRES A INSP OF THE AREA EVERY 400 HOURS, THE CRACK WAS NOTICED WITH 278.2 HOURS SINCE THE LAST INSP.
(CAN) THIS ELEVATOR LEADING EDGE RIB WAS FOUND CRACKED WHILE CARRYING OUT ANNUAL INSPECTION. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE CRACK WAS THE RESULT OF TOO SHARP OF A BEND RADIUS IN THE AREA WHERE THE PART GETS RIVETED TO THE ELEVATOR LEADING EDGE SKIN. THIS DEFECT WAS COMMUNICATED AND THE TOOLING HAS BEEN REPAIRED ALLOWING FOR A MOVE UNIFORM RADIUS ON THE PART IN QUESTION. (TC NR 20070426009)
(CAN) LT AND RT ELEVATOR FRONT SPAR UPPER ATTACH HOLES FOR CENTER HINGE POSITION HAS A SMALL CRACKS AROUND THE UPPER AN3 BOLT HOLE.
27Elevator Control System112.4%0
Parts most often named Control Cable (3) · Rod (2) · Torque Tube (2) · Push-Pull Rod (2)
PUSH/PULL TUBE WAS REMOVED FROM THE ACFT DURING AN ANNUAL INSPECTION AND WAS FOUND TO HAVE SEVERE PITTING AND HOLES THRU THE TUBE. FOUND THE ALUMINUM WAS SEVERLY CORRODED AT THE AREA WHERE IT MATES WITH THE STEEL TUBE. CORROSION WAS SO SEVERE IT CRACKED THE FITTING. ONLY WAY TO DISCOVER THE CRACK WAS TO DISASSEMBLE PART WHICH IS USUALLY ONLY DONE AT A REPAIR SHOP.
(CAN) DURING FUEL BAY MX, THE ELEVATOR PUSH PULL ROD ASSY PN C2CF619A8 WAS NOTED TO HAVE BLISTERING IN THE PAINT COVERING. ON FURTHER INVESTIGATION THE BLISTERS WERE REMOVED TO REVEAL CORROSION, WATER AND A HOLES IN THE TUBE ASSY. THE UNIT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM [S/N removed] PENDING NDT INSP AND REPAIR/OVERHAUL. (TC 20100217001)
DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE BEARING IN THE ELEVATOR BELL CRANK ASSY, THE LINKS AND SPACERS WERE THE ELEVATOR CABLE ATTACHES WERE FOUND WORN, SPACERS WERE WORN RIGHT THROUGH (PN C2CF349ND). THE AN3 BOLT THAT ATTACHES LINK IN PLACE WAS WORN 1/3 THROUGH. SPACERS AND BOLTS WERE REPLACED.
28Fuel Selector/Shut-Off Valve92.0%1
Parts most often named Selector (2) · Cable (1) · Shaft (1) · Handle (1)
(CAN) REMOVED CABLE DRUM FROM FUEL SELECTOR, LUBRICATED SELECTOR WITH YIELD AND REINSTALLED CABLE DRUM. (TC NR 20070711007)
(CAN) STRONG FUEL ODOR IN COCKPIT. INVESTIGATED AND FOUND FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE WAS LEAKING. OVERHAULED PN PV3320-10 INSTALLED AND SYSTEM CHECKED FOR LEAKS. AIRCRAFT [S/N removed]. (TC NR 20071024006)
(CAN) FUEL SELECTOR CABLE VERY BADLY CORRODED, CABLE FAILED WHEN REMOVED. NO LOG BOOKS OR RECORDS AVAILABLE. (TC NR 20071214003)
25Emergency Locator Beacon92.0%1
Parts most often named G Switch (4) · Elt (2) · Battery (2) · Antenna (1)
DURING A ROUTINE ELT INSPECTION IAW 14 CFR 91.207, THE ELT G SWITCH WAS FOUND TO BE NON-FUNCTIONAL. THIS IS A RECURRING PROBLEM WITH THESE BEACONS.
DURING A ROUTINE ELT INSPECTION IAW 14 CFR 91.207, THE G SWITCH WAS FOUND TO BE INOPERATIVE. THIS IS A RECURRING PROBLEM WITH THESE BEACONS.
(CAN) BATTERY REPLACED AFTER YEAR 1, (SUPPOSED TO BE A 5 YEAR LITHIUM BATTERY) G SWITCH FAILURE 3 TIMES IN 4 YEARS. UNIT HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH ACK 406MHZ ELT. (TC# 20140916006)
Open a row to read what mechanics wrote. Tail and serial numbers are removed.
At the pre-buy
My pre-buy card · Beaver
0 of 7 looked at
The components written up most often since 2011. Take this to the pre-buy and ask your inspector about each one; tap a mark to record what they found. Saved on this device only.
- Reciprocating Engine Cylinder Section
- Wheel/Ski/Float
- Emergency Locator Beacon
- Magneto/Distributor
- Reciprocating Engine Power Section
- Main Landing Gear
- Electrical Power System Wiring
A starting point for the conversation with your inspector, not maintenance advice.
What buyers get caught by
The expensive surprises on any used airplane are missing logbooks, corrosion under paint, outstanding ADs, an engine near overhaul, and the same squawk written up again and again. The card lists where the Beaver gets written up; the AD timetable below lists what the FAA requires.
Ask for the logbook entries that match each item. A repeated entry is a pattern, not a coincidence.
Alerts for the Beaver
An email when a new airworthiness directive names the Beaver, or when reports on it spike. Alerts are starting soon: leave your email and we’ll send a confirmation link before anything else. Unsubscribe anytime.
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